Do Teens Make Rational Choices? The Case of Teen Nonmarital Childbearing by R. Haveman et al.
Institute for Research on Poverty
Discussion Paper no. 1137-97
Do Teens Make Rational Choices?
The Case of Teen Nonmarital Childbearing
Robert Haveman
Department of Economics




Department of Preventive Medicine









The authors would like to thank the participants from workshops given at Tinbergen Institute,
Amsterdam; Institute for Fiscal Studies, London; Leiden University; University of Limburg; and Tilburg
University. Financial support from the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study and the Smith
Richardson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
IRP publications (discussion papers, special reports, and the newsletter Focus) are now available
electronically. The IRP Web Site can be accessed at the following address: http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/Abstract
With emphasis on the role of economic incentives, we explore the determinants of a woman’s
choice of whether or not to give birth as an unmarried teenager. Our data are taken from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics. Guided by a simple utility-maximization model, we represent the income
possibilities available to teenaged women if they do and do not give birth out of wedlock. We estimate
these choice-conditioned income possibilities through a two-stage probit procedure, relying on the
observed incomes of a secondary sample of somewhat older women. The response of the young women
in our primary sample to these income expectations is measured after controlling for the effects of a
variety of other factors, including the characteristics of the girl’s family, the social and economic
environment in which she lives (including such policy-related factors as expenditures by states on family
planning programs and education), and her own prior choices. We use the estimated structural parameters
from our model to simulate the effects of a variety of policy interventions on the probability of becoming
an unmarried teen mother. Our estimations provide evidence that income expectations have a persistent
influence on the childbearing decision. They also provide evidence that the provision of public family
planning expenditures and increases in parental education could reduce the prevalence of teen nonmarital
births.President Bill Clinton, in his 1995 State of the Union Message.
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Although teen unwed mothers have less income, more marital instability, and lower educational attainment
2
than those who these outcomes may be attributable to unmeasured adverse family background or personal
characteristics. Maynard (1997) contains a set of studies exploring the consequences and costs of adolescent
childbearing, including efforts to account for this selection problem. Geronimous and Korenman (1992, 1993),
Hoffman, Foster, and Furstenberg (1993), Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, and Sealand (1993), and Bronars and
Grogger (1994) have all attempted to account for this potential selection effect in estimates of the consequences for
mothers of teenage and unwed childbearing, with varying results. Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (1997) use a natural
experiment—a comparison of teen mothers with women who became pregnant as teens but who experienced a
miscarriage—to account for adverse unmeasured effects, and suggest that virtually all of the costs associated with
early childbearing are a manifestation of this selection effect. Their conclusion, however, depends on the extent to
which miscarriages are purely random events, and there are important reasons for believing that this is not the case.
There is substantial evidence that the children born to teenage mothers (especially those who are not
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married) are more likely to grow up in a poor and mother-only family, live in a poor or underclass neighborhood,
and experience high risks to both their health status and school achievements. See Haveman, Wolfe, and Peterson
(1997) and Wolfe and Perozek (1997). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) deal with this issue as well.
Do Teens Make Rational Choices?
The Case of Teen Nonmarital Childbearing
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of teen nonmarital childbearing has been described as the nation’s “most serious
social problem.”  Annually, there are now more than one-half million births to U.S. teenagers, and this
1
number grows by about 50,000 every four years. Teen births now account for about 13 percent of all
births and nearly one-quarter of all African-American births. Even more dramatic is the very sharp
increase in nonmarital births, shown in Figure 1. Today, nearly three-quarters of births to teenagers are
out-of-wedlock; among non-Hispanic blacks nearly all (95 percent) teen births occur out-of-wedlock.
This pattern is viewed as a social and economic problem because of the presumed adverse effects
on the human capital and the future productivity of both teen unmarried mothers and their children.
While the longer-term impacts of early nonmarital childbearing on young mothers is unsettled among
researchers,  the adverse effects of being born to a teen mother are not.
2 3
The generosity and accessibility of welfare benefits have been cited as an important determinant
of teen nonmarital childbearing, as have sexual education in the schools, the increased availability of
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We recognize that the childbearing outcome for an unmarried teenager reflects an extensive set of choices
4
made by the woman, including, for example, whether or not to be sexually active, whether or not to use
contraceptives, and if pregnant whether to have an abortion. For analytical convenience, we focus on this final
decision of whether or not to have a child.
grow up, and the poor labor market prospects available to those groups with the highest teen nonmarital
birth rates. Unfortunately, knowledge of the relative strength of these potentially causal linkages is weak.
Here, we study the determinants of this individual choice, emphasizing the response of youths to
economic incentives associated with alternative responses.  These incentives are represented by the
4
income possibilities available to young women if they give birth as an unmarried teen or if they forgo
childbearing while unmarried and an adolescent. We also measure the effects of a variety of other
factors, including the characteristics of the girl’s family and its choices, the social and economic
environment in which she lives (including policy-related factors, such as expenditures by states on family
planning programs and education), and her own prior choices.
Following a brief review of research on the determinants of the teen nonmarital birth decision,
we present a simple utility-maximization model of an adolescent woman’s choice regarding whether or
not to have a birth out of wedlock. Expected utilities (incomes) conditional on either experiencing or not
experiencing a teen nonmarital birth play a crucial role in this model, as do family characteristics and the
neighborhood and policy environment. After describing our data, we explain our procedures for
estimating the conditional income expectations that we attribute to older teenagers, and present our
estimates of these expected incomes. We then estimate a model designed to capture the effects of
conditional expectations on the childbearing decision, and use the estimated structural parameters to
simulate the effects of a variety of policy interventions on the probability of experiencing nonmarital
birth as a teen.4
See also Akerlof, Yellen, and Katz (1996), who use a game theory framework to explore the effect of
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improved contraceptive and abortion technology to explain the increase in the prevalence of out-of-wedlock births.
II. A TOUR OF RESEARCH STUDIES
The earliest microdata study of the determinants of adolescent nonmarital births is that of Hogan
and Kitagawa (1985), who find that among a sample of 1,000 African-American teenage women in
Chicago, nonmarital birth probabilities are positively related to a variety of adverse parental and
background circumstances experienced during childhood. More recent studies of this outcome use
longitudinal data, and thus include richer information on a child’s background observed at several points
during their formative years. These include Antel (1988), who uses 1979–1986 data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) in a bivariate probit specification designed to control for possible
unobserved family-specific heterogeneity; Plotnick (1991) and Lundberg and Plotnick (1990), who also
use the NLSY, but add information on state welfare policy, state family planning policy, and the
socioeconomic environment proxied by characteristics of the girl’s school.
More recently, Brooks-Gunn and Chase-Lansdale (1995) use a 20-year data set of about 300 low-
income African-American families in Baltimore, and emphasize the critical roles of child care, the
extended family, and the parenting ability of young mothers on the probability of this outcome.
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Parental economic resources and schooling are included as determinants of the teen nonmarital
birth decision in nearly all of these studies. The estimated coefficient on the level of parental education is
always negative and statistically significant; the estimated coefficient on parental income is negative and
usually, but not always, significant. There is some evidence that the source of family income matters;
parental welfare receipt generally has a positive effect on the probability that teens will choose to give
birth out of wedlock. A number of other determinants of the nonmarital birth outcome are often
statistically significant, including indicators of family structure, family stress factors (such as family5
Murray (1984) has argued that the availability and generosity of welfare benefits play an important role in
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explaining teen childbearing choices. However, several studies have failed to support this claim. See Duncan and
Hoffman (1990), An, Haveman, and Wolfe (1993), Lundberg and Plotnick (1990), Acs (1993), Moffitt (1994),
Haveman and Wolfe (1995), and Clarke and Strauss (1995). Moffitt (1992) summarizes much of this evidence.
disruptions and geographic moves during childhood), and parental attitude, expectations, monitoring and
control of children, and contraceptive practice.
These studies vary widely in data, model specification, and estimation techniques. Some use
ordinary least squares estimation methods, while most employ maximum likelihood techniques (e.g.,
probit, tobit); a few employ simultaneous estimation methods designed to characterize interrelated or
joint outcomes (e.g., experiencing a teen nonmarital birth and subsequent welfare recipiency). Several of
the studies view the teen out-of-wedlock birth outcome as an age-dependent probabilistic phenomenon,
and employ hazard rate estimation methods. The extensiveness of variables describing social and parental
investments in children ranges widely across the studies.
Studies that attempt to relate the girl’s own decisions to the choice-conditioned opportunities and
constraints with which she is confronted are rare. The earliest is Duncan and Hoffman (1990), who
estimate a two-stage logit model in which the teenage nonmarital birth choice is viewed as dependent
upon the girl’s comparison of income opportunities associated with alternative choices; maximum state
AFDC benefits and earned family income at age 26 are taken as crude proxies of these opportunities.
A more recent effort is Rosenzweig (1995), who models the initial fertility and marriage
decisions of young women (incorporating concern for child quality and assortative mating) in an attempt
to identify the independent effect of AFDC benefit levels on these choices.  Using eight cohorts of
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women in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and a fixed effects model to control for
unobservable and permanent differences across cohorts and states, he relates three mutually exclusive
marriage and fertility outcomes to variables reflecting expectations of future choice-conditioned
opportunities (including welfare benefits) and a measure of the women’s endowments. He finds that6
Rosenzweig’s variable reflecting the “real” value of welfare may confound welfare generosity with time-
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related changes in state-specific earnings opportunities for low earnings, low ability, and minority youths, because
this latter variable remains unmeasured. Hence, his large reported welfare effect could be interpreted as a response
to market opportunities. A recent effort to replicate Rosenzweig’s results using an alternative data source (PSID)
failed to find large and significant welfare effects using samples based on more cohorts and superior information on
welfare benefit levels, parental characteristics, and measures of nonmarital births. See Hoffman and Foster (1997).
Hotz and Miller (1988) and Wolpin (1984) illustrate the application of dynamic programming techniques
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to fertility-related choices. See also Eckstein and Wolpin (1989), who also discuss the enormous computational
burden of this approach and the extensive assumptions required for estimation of identifiable model parameters.
higher welfare benefits have a small but statistically significant overall effect, but a large effect on
women with poor parents.
7
A few studies have attempted to measure the effect of the social and policy environment on
children’s attainments, including Lundberg and Plotnick (1990, 1995) and Haveman, Wolfe, and
Peterson (1997). They find that public family planning policies (measured by state-specific indicators of
abortion accessibility/costs and contraceptive availability) have large and statistically significant effects
on the probability of teen childbearing.
None of these studies attempts to measure the determinants of teen nonmarital fertility-related
choices (e.g., contraception, abortion) in a dynamic framework, or as these choices interact with labor
supply, schooling, and post-birth marital choices.  We also have opted for a more static approach, and
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emphasize the role of choice-conditioned expectations, extensive information on family characteristics
and choices, neighborhood attributes, and a characterization of the policy environment in which the girl
lives in explaining this outcome. Similarly, none of the prior studies includes information on the male
partners of the women, as no longitudinal data set contains linked information on mothers’ nonmarital
male partners. This is an important limitation of these studies, and of the results presented here.
III. A SIMPLE UTILITY MODEL OF TEEN NONMARITAL CHILDBEARING
With few exceptions, prior studies have neglected the effect on teen childbearing decisions of
youth expectations of the expected utility (or income) returns to having, or not having, a child out of7
wedlock. As a result, available estimates may attribute to background and family characteristics effects
properly attributed to differences in choice-conditioned expected incomes.
Here, we set out a simple model of the teen nonmarital birth decision that rests on the view that
the childbearing choice of young unmarried women reflects the response of a rational utility maximizer
to expectations of utility returns associated with alternative options which are available to her. We begin
with a utility function which is separable in consumption (G) and childbearing (C):
U = f(C,x) + Z lnG + ￿  , (1) ii i g i e i
where f(C,x) = the nonincome effects of teen unmarried childbearing ii
C = childbearing of individual I i
x = variables which affect the nonincome effects of teen unmarried childbearing i
G = lifetime discounted stream of consumption i
Z  = weight of consumption in utility g
￿  = random utility term (conditional on childbearing) ei
The generalization of f(.) to be a function of both C and x allows young women to have different ii
nonincome effects of teen nonmarital childbearing related to their family’s characteristics and those of
the larger community in which they live. These characteristics—for example, parental income—may
affect the perceptions and aspirations of the young women, and hence their assessment of the nonincome
consequences of nonmarital childbearing. The nonincome “costs” of avoiding childbearing—for
example, the cost of acquiring and using contraceptives or obtaining an abortion—are also reflected in
this component of the model.
The young woman maximizes utility subject to budget constraints relating childbearing and
income:
budget constraints: Y = ￿(Q)c + ￿ (2) ii i i
G  ￿   Y i   i8
This assumes that the expectation formation process is constant across all individuals. If this process is, in
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fact, unknown, the estimation of expected income streams may be impossible. See Manski (1993).
where: Y = lifetime discounted income stream i
￿(Q) = returns to an individual conditional on unmarried teen childbearing i
Q = variables which affect returns to unmarried teen childbearing i
 ￿ = random component of income i
Allowing ￿ to vary with Q allows family characteristics, and those of the larger society in which the
woman lives, to affect the income returns to the teen out-of-wedlock childbearing choice.
We presume that unmarried teens do not know their future income prospects with certainty, and
form expectations regarding choice-conditioned economic position by observing the incomes of an older
cohort of young women with similar characteristics who make similar choices.
9
E[Y|Q,c = c] = ￿ (Q)c     for Q = Q (3) ii i j j j i j
If i chooses to give birth while unmarried and a teen, her expected income will equal that of j, who
carries the same set of characteristics that influence Y through the ￿(Q) transformation process.
If childbearing were continuous, the solution would have the following form:
￿(Q) = -[Udf(C,x)/dC]  /U (4) if i i i g
          (mrt)              (mrs)
indicating that the teen woman chooses childbearing such that the marginal rate of transformation (mrt)
of childbearing for income equals the marginal rate of substitution (mrs) of childbearing for
consumption. The choice between childbearing options reflects these marginal benefits and costs.
The role of family and broader community characteristics and prior choices is reflected in ￿(Q) i
and -[U df(C,x)/dC]. Variables in Q that increase ￿ will increase childbearing by increasing the mrt of fi ii i
that choice; that is, factors that increase the returns to childbearing will increase its level. Similarly,
variables that influence the nonincome effects of childbearing (mrs) will alter the level of this outcome
that is observed.9
And, again, ideally, the characteristics and prior decisions of her sexual partners.
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A discrete analogue of this continuous framework recognizes that the childbearing decision is
dichotomous, such that the woman will give birth if the expected utility of childbearing exceeds the
expected utility of not having a child while unmarried. Substituting the budget constraint into the utility
function altered to reflect this discrete choice, and rearranging terms, reveals that the woman will bear a
child if:
(F  - F )x + {E[lnY ] - E[lnY ]} Z  > ￿  - ￿ (5) 10 1 0 g 0 1
where F x = f(C,x). Therefore, a young, unmarried woman’s decision to give birth is not entirely 1,0
random, and would be repeated given the information available.
The probability that the individual will choose to give birth is:
Pr  = Pr[ ￿ < Fx + {E[lnY ] - E[lnY ]}Z ] (6) 11 0 g
where ￿ = ￿  - ￿  and F = F  - F . 01 1 0
Hence, the posture that we adopt focuses on the effect of the expected income possibilities
available to the woman under both birth outcome possibilities. These expectations reflect the economic
incentives that will influence her decision, and the characteristics and prior choices of herself, her family,
and the larger society.  These characteristics and prior choices can also directly affect the young
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woman’s decision, apart from any influence they have on the income expectations. As noted above, while
the teen woman’s choice of whether or not to give birth is often made simultaneously with schooling
(e.g., whether to graduate from high school) or marital decisions, our model does not reflect the complex
joint and dynamic interaction among these decisions.10
The PSID data provides longitudinal information on 5,000 families beginning in 1968. We use available
11
data covering 21 years of information—from 1968 to 1988.
Only those females who remained in the survey for each year until 1988 are included. In Haveman and
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Wolfe (1994), we studied the effect of attrition on our sample, and concluded that, with the exception of race, those
who attrited do not appear to differ from the remaining sample. (Previous studies of attrition in the PSID also find
little reason for concern that attrition has reduced the representativeness of the sample. See Becketti, Gould, Lillard,
and Welch, 1988, and Lillard and Panis, 1994.) In a few cases, observations could not be used and are excluded
from the analysis. These include persons with two or more contiguous years of missing data. Those observations
with but one (contiguous) year of missing data were retained and the missing data were filled in by averaging the
data for the two years contiguous to the year of missing data. For the first and last years of the sample, this
averaging of the contiguous years is not possible. In this case, the contiguous year’s value is assigned, adjusted if
appropriate using other information that is reported.
IV. ESTIMATION OF THE TEEN CHILDBEARING CHOICE MODEL
Empirical specification of our model relies heavily on estimation of the choice-conditioned
income expectations that we attribute to teen female decision makers. However, prior to describing these
expectation variables and our estimation of them and the full model, we describe the data on which our
analysis relies.
A. Data on Teen Women, Their Families, and Their Neighborhoods
Our estimates are based on two large longitudinal data sets constructed from a national stratified
sample of families, the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The first data set—our
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primary sample composed of younger individuals whose choices we model—includes 873 girls who were
ages 0–6 in the beginning year of the survey; they were followed until 1988, at which time they are
young adults, ranging in age from 21 to 27 years.  A secondary sample consisting of a somewhat older
12
cohort includes 720 females who were aged 8–12 years in 1968, and who were 30 to 34 years old in
1988; this sample is used to estimate the choice-specific income expectation variables employed in our
choice model.
For individuals in both data sets, we have extensive information on family status, income and
source of income, parental education, neighborhood characteristics, and background characteristics such
as race, religion, and location. In order to make comparisons of individuals with different birth years, we11
For each state, we have annual data from 1968 to 1988 on the state maximum benefits for the Aid to
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Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the maximum Food Stamp benefit, and the average Medicaid
expenditures for AFDC families. In incorporating this information into our basic data set, we match maximum
benefits (the maximum amount paid by the state as of July of that year to a family of four with no other income), in
1976 dollars (deflated by the personal consumption expenditure deflator) for the years when the child is ages 6 to
21. For food stamps, the benefit is the amount of the allotment (or the allotment minus the purchase requirement)
for a family of four with no other income, again measured as of July of that year. Finally, average Medicaid
expenditures for each state equal three times the state-specific fiscal year per child Medicaid expenditures for
dependent children under 21 who are in categorically needy families plus the state-specific average per person
annual Medicaid payments for adults in categorically needy families. These are deflated into 1976 dollars using the
Current Price Index for medical care.
1984 values are an average of 1983 and 1985 values for each observation; 1986 values are an average of
14
1985 and 1987 values.
The matching was done by combining geographic codes added to the annual PSID data over the years
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1968 to 1985 by the Michigan Survey Research Center to 1970 and 1980 Census data. Using 1970 and 1980 Census
data, we assign neighborhood values to the neighborhood in which each family in the PSID lived to Census data. In
most cases, this link is based on a match of the location of our observations to the relevant Census tract or block
numbering area (67.8 percent for 1970 and 71.5 percent for 1980). For years prior to 1970 we use 1970 data; for
years after 1980 we use 1980 data while for years 1971–1979 we used a weighted combination of 1970 and 1980
data (weights are .9 (1970) and .1 (1980) for 1971; .8 (1970) and .2 (1980) for 1972 and so on).
indexed the time-varying data elements in each data set by age. All monetary values are expressed in
1976 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all items.
We merged onto both the primary and secondary data sets state-specific policy information,
including an annual, state-specific series of welfare generosity,  average state unemployment rates, the
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average per capita expenditures on family planning by the public sector in the state,  whether or not the
14
state required parental consent for abortions, whether or not the state Medicaid program funds abortions,
average county expenditures per capita for education, state prevalence of belonging to religious
organizations, and average state median income. These jurisdiction-based policy variables are measured
during the teenage years of the girls in our sample, and are matched on an annual basis to the state
(county) in which the child resided each year.
Finally, we added neighborhood information to our primary data set, constructed by matching
small area data from the 1970 and 1980 Censuses to the location of the children.  The merged
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neighborhood data include information on the unemployment rate, the proportion of persons in high
status occupations, the proportion of youths that drop out of high school, and the proportion of families12
Personal income is defined as the sum of the person’s own earnings, transfer benefits, and unearned
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income from all other sources. We use it rather than individual earnings, because transfer income (including welfare
benefits) is not contained in earnings and therefore omits an important component of the relevant expected
economic well-being concept specified in our model. We use personal income rather than family income, because
the latter incorporates issues of family composition and allocation which are outside of our model and, for the most
part, our observation.
The variables included in this equation include mother’s education (dummy variables indicating high
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school graduation, some college or college completion); race, family position (first born, average number of
siblings), whether the mother gave birth out of wedlock as a teen, and background variables measured over ages
12–15 (average of dummies for years in each of three regions, years lived in an urban area, years head of household
was disabled, years lived with one parent, years mother worked, years family received AFDC, and the years the
families post-tax income was below the poverty line). Also included (and used as identifiers) are the person’s own
health (two dummy variables indicating if fair or poor; if excellent), mother’s own teen childbearing, prevalence of
religious membership in the state, and state variables related to the availability of abortions and family planning.
The means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in Appendix 1. The values for ages 12–15 are used
because they are the longest period available for the secondary sample.
that are female headed in the neighborhood in which the family of each child in our primary sample lived
for each of the years from 1968 to 1985.
B. Income Expectations with Alternative Childbearing Choices
We rely on our secondary, older cohort sample in estimating the choice-specific expected income
variables for each girl in our primary sample. These expectation variables are obtained from estimated
parameters of a series of personal income  equations fit over observations in the secondary sample,
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together with the relevant characteristics of the girls in our primary sample.
As a first step, we divide our older cohort into those who have and those who have not given
birth through age 18 and are unmarried. We then estimate a reduced form probit equation with this
dichotomous childbearing outcome as the dependent variable.  (In our sample of 720 older females, 128
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gave birth as a teen and 592 did not.) From this equation, we calculate an inverse Mills ratio selectivity
correction (lambda) variable for each person in the older sample.
Finally, we estimate 11 tobit equations (one for each year from ages 19 to 29) for each of the two
childbearing groups—the group of teens who gave birth while unmarried and the group that did13
We included in these equations variables likely to be related to the personal income dependent variable
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[race (African-American = 1), family position (if first born and average number of siblings while 12–15), parental
education (high school graduate, some college or college graduate dummy variables for the highest level of
education each parent)], and a variety of background variables, including proportion of years lived with one parent,
proportion of years mother worked, proportion of years lived in an urban area, proportion of years head of
household was disabled, the average family income relative to needs, proportion of years received AFDC, the
average median family income in the state in which the girl lived while age 12–15, and the average state
unemployment rate in the state in which the girl lived while age 12–15. The last two variables are included to
capture the variation in state labor market opportunities. For the group who gave birth as teens, the maximum AFDC
payment in the state in which they lived at each age is also included. The means and standard deviations of these
variables are shown in Appendix 1. The 12–15 age range for most background variables is determined by the period
of observation for the older sample.
In the income regressions, growing up in a family where there are many siblings is associated with a
19
reduction in income for those who have a teen birth, but an increase in income for those who do not have a teen
birth. Similarly, the coefficient estimate on the state median income variable is negative and often significant in the
teen-birth income estimates, but positive and statistically significant in the without-a-teen-birth estimates. Growing
up in a family that received AFDC is associated with higher incomes among individuals who have a teen birth, but
has no statistically significant (and usually negative) association with income among individuals who do not have a
teen birth. Although state AFDC generosity (included only in the income equations for those with a teen birth) is
positive and significant in about half the equations, at older ages (above age 25) it has a negative but insignificant
effect on income. The family income/needs ratio is positive and significant in about half of the no-birth equations,
but not significant in any of the teen birth equations and generally small in magnitude. Being African American is
positive in most of the income equations for those with a teen birth (but generally not significant), while in the no
birth equations it is negative in the early years but positive in the later years (and occasionally significant). The
lambda term is significant in almost all equations for those without a teen birth, and three of the equations for those
with a teen birth. The other variables generally have the expected sign, but are not consistently statistically
significant.
We have 21 years of information on each individual in each sample. Hence, we are constrained from
20
using incomes beyond age 29 because of the need to include childhood experience variables as predictors of
incomes as an adult.
In using the coefficients to predict income at each age, conditional on the individuals in our primary
21
sample choosing to give birth out of wedlock as a teen or not, we do not use the lambda term—that is, we make an
unconditional prediction. In order to avoid reducing or increasing the expected income by omitting this term, we add
not—with personal income as the dependent variable.  In each equation, we include the inverse Mills
18
ratio selectivity term (lambda) estimated from the first stage probit estimation in order to control for self-
selection into one of the childbearing outcomes. The results of the first and second stage estimates are
generally as expected and are available from the authors.
19
We use the relevant individual characteristics of each girl in our primary sample, together with
the coefficients from the two sets of 11 regressions to predict income values (for each of the ages from 19
to 29) for each primary sample observation.  Two 11-year series of predicted expectations are obtained;
20
one series representing income expectations should each girl give birth as an unmarried teen, and another
11-year series of expected incomes assuming that she chooses not to have a teen nonmarital birth.
2114
the mean expected value of the lambda times its coefficient to the constant term in predicting income for each age
and for both childbearing outcomes.
For example, Hotz, McElroy, and Sanders (1997) find that receipt of AFDC declines among teen mothers
22
in their mid-twenties. They also find that controlling for background, teen mothers work few hours as teens but by
their mid-twenties work more hours than if they had delayed childbearing.
These predictions can be interpreted as the impact of simulating that all of the young women in the
23
sample did not have a teen nonmarital birth. If those who did bear a child out of wedlock are simulated as having
chosen not to have a birth while unmarried, they would increase their income substantially. Their incomes in early
years would be greater than those of the women who actually did not give birth, but they would face a lower rate of
income growth.
The predicted mean values of these personal income expectations (and the standard deviation for
each mean value) are shown in Table 1 for each of the 11 years for each of the assumed childbearing
outcomes. These predicted values are shown for the entire primary sample, and for each of the two
childbearing groups in that sample. The childbearing-conditioned expected income patterns are revealing.
For ages 19 and 20, predicted income if the teen gives birth while unmarried is higher than if she does
not give birth. However, the income trajectory in the teen-mother option shows virtually no real growth
after age 20. The drop in the mid-twenties is consistent with the observed pattern of early receipt of
AFDC followed by an attempt to shift to the labor market.  Mean expected income assuming no teen
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unmarried birth generally increases over the 11 years, and because of its steeper slope exceeds predicted
income of a teenage mother in her twenties. (Note that the predicted incomes with and without a birth are
for the same individuals.) Beginning at age 21, the relative predicted income trajectories suggest
substantial gains to not giving birth as an unmarried teen.
In the second two panels of Table 1, expected incomes for the teens who did not have a
nonmarital birth (with their characteristics) can be compared to those of teens who did give birth out of
wedlock. After age 23, assuming a teen nonmarital birth, the predicted incomes of the girls who did not
have a nonmarital birth diverges rapidly from those of the teen unmarried mothers (assuming no teen
nonmarital birth, there is no difference). Perhaps most interestingly, girls who are in fact unmarried
mothers have substantially higher expected incomes with that childbearing outcome than those girls who
in fact did not have an unmarried birth would have had if they had chosen to give birth.
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TABLE 1
Predicted Incomes of Young Women Who Become and Do Not Become Teenaged Mothers
(1976 dollars)
           Teen Birth                    No Teen Birth       
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Whole Sample
Age 19 $2,907.8 $912.8 $2,184.9 639.6
Age 20 3,069.9 1,306.9 2,703.3 905.2
Age 21 2,226.3 805.7 3,017.2 950.4
Age 22 2,100.9 1,530.5 3,845.1 1,000.1
Age 23 2,471.1 1,582.3 4,469.0 1,065.1
Age 24 1,705.1 1,624.4 4,592.1 744.0
Age 25 1,815.4 1,398.6 4,998.4 1,207.8
Age 26 2,235.8 857.7 5,370.3 1,701.3
Age 27 992.1 940.8 6,002.3 1,533.9
Age 28 2,570.4 1,100.6 5,966.7 1,301.2
Age 29 2,086.0 1,408.1 5,869.5 1,271.3
Net Present Value 19,419.0 7,351.2 37,828.0 7,437.2
Those without Teen Birth
Age 19 2,973.6 829.0 2,203.9 630.8
Age 20 3,043.2 1,305.4 2,718.0 921.7
Age 21 2,162.5 782.9 2,991.4 957.2
Age 22 1,992.4 1,485.2 3,839.5 1,015.2
Age 23 2,363.0 1,550.7 4,490.2 1,086.3
Age 24 1,552.5 1,510.6 4,598.0 755.7
Age 25 1,700.1 1,322.5 5,011.2 1,238.2
Age 26 2,216.0 847.6 5,409.2 1,747.7
Age 27 914.7 868.1 6,036.2 1,570.6
Age 28 2,501.7 1,019.6 5,986.0 1,325.2
Age 29 1,970.1 1,317.9 5,863.5 1,287.3
Net Present Value 18,815.0 6,921.4 39,726.0 7,580.7
Those with Teen Birth
Age 19 2,190.6 828.9 1,977.6 791.3
Age 20 3,360.8 1,292.9 2,543.0 683.6
Age 21 2,922.4 721.2 3,298.1 825.7
Age 22 3,284.2 1,524.0 3,906.4 818.6
Age 23 3,649.7 1,444.3 4,237.5 764.7
Age 24 3,369.4 1,880.0 4,527.7 600.4
Age 25 3,072.9 1,583.7 4,859.7 796.3
Age 26 2,452.4 937.6 4,946.4 982.5
Age 27 1,836.2 1,245.6 5,632.5 986.2
Age 28 3,320.5 1,577.4 5,755.0 983.4
Age 29 3,350.5 1,715.0 5,934.8 1,084.9
Net Present Value 26,006.0 8,610.4 36,758.0 5,558.416
We discount each of the choice-conditioned, age-19-to-29 expected income streams for each girl
in the primary sample to age 16 (a likely age for making decisions that influence whether or not to give
birth as a teen) using a discount rate of 3 percent. This procedure implicitly assumes that at age 16, each
young woman in our primary sample forms her expectations of future childbearing-conditioned incomes
by observing the realized incomes of persons like themselves who are in their late teens and
twenties—hence, our use of conditional income terms constructed from the experiences of individuals in
our secondary sample while they were ages 19 to 29. In this sense, our expected income terms may be
superior to estimates of full lifetime incomes. Note that by including incomes during the late teens and
early twenties, we capture the opportunity costs in the form of income forgone due to postponed working,
or delayed marriage, that may be associated with early childbearing.
These present-value estimates are shown at the bottom of each panel in Table 1. The expected
present value of income for the average young woman in the sample, if she were not to give birth as an
unmarried teen, is $93,284 (in 1992 dollars; $36,758 on table); the average expected present value if they
chose to have a nonmarital birth is $47,887, for a difference of $45,397 (in 1992 dollars). Interestingly,
the gain from not giving birth as a teen is far greater for whites ($47,732) than for African Americans
($15,575; not on table).
C. The Effect of Income Expectations on Teen Childbearing Choices
For each individual, the difference in the natural logarithms of the present value of their income
predictions—the one for “if no teen birth” minus that for “if a teen birth”; E[lnY ] - E[lnY ]—is taken to 10
reflect the expected net opportunity gain associated with deciding to not bear a child out of wedlock, and17
There is substantial overlap in the characteristics of the teen women who do and do not give birth out of
24
wedlock. Our reduced form model predicting this choice fails to explain a high proportion of the choices made,
suggesting but limited self-selection in terms of the economic opportunities facing young women in their choices of
child birth options; adolescents with both low forgone income associated with giving birth and high forgone income
are observed to both give birth and to refrain from giving birth. This avoids a potential identification problem in the
use of these income expectation variables to explain the choices observed.
For example, while a change in the probability of marriage associated with the teen nonmarital
25
childbearing decision might increase the income of the household in which the woman lives, it would also increase
needs and involve personal nonpecuniary benefits and costs; we are assuming that these benefits and costs net out to
zero. Use of the expected difference in family income-to-needs would require a quite different set of implicit
assumptions. Because children increase the level of the family needs measure, we would be assuming that children
entail a reduction of the mother’s utility apart from any effect on her expected future income. Further, using family
income relative to needs to proxy for utility would entail assuming that, if the young woman lives with her parents,
their income would tend to raise her utility, and that there are no costs associated with her living with her parents
apart from those reflected in the family income relative to needs measure. Similarly, if the woman would marry or
cohabit, this procedure would implicitly assume that all of the benefits of this living arrangement are reflected in the
partner’s income and that any costs are reflected in the increase in the measure of family needs due to the addition
of another adult.
There are a variety of criteria that could be used to define “teen births.” We have chosen age 18 as the
26
cutoff because most of the policy concern is directed at childbearing during ages when high school attendance is
expected. We could focus on only younger ages, but the relatively rare occurrence of births at ages 15 and 16 limits
our ability to explore the determinants of this outcome.
included in our structural model of the decision of whether or not to give birth as a teen. This approach is
similar to models involving switching with endogenous selection in Manski (1987) and Lee (1979).
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Several assumptions are implicit in our use of this indicator of the expected gain from choosing
to forgo an unmarried birth as a proxy for the difference in her utility in the two states. First, since the
consumption term is separable, we are assuming that the utility from income is the same if a woman does
or does not give birth as a teen. By using the personal income of the young women, rather than their
future family income relative to needs, we implicitly assume that the effects of the teen childbearing
decision on the future living arrangements of the mother (including cohabitation, marriage, or living with
parents) have expected benefits that are just equal to the costs (see also note 16).
25
The estimates are presented in Table 2. The dependent variable in the models is equal to 1 if the
young woman bore a child while unmarried and 18 years of age or less, and 0 otherwise.  Unweighted
2618
TABLE 2
Reduced Form and Structural Teen Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing Models
(Dependent Variable: Gave Birth Out of Wedlock as an Unmarried Teenager = 1)
N = 873
Reduced-Form Probit Structural Model Structural Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
ab
Variable (Std. Error)  (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
LN[Pred. income if no teen birth] - -1.10 -0.66
LN[Pred. income if teen birth] (0.16)*** (0.30)***
Average education expenditures per 0.00 0.11 -0.21
capita in county, ages 6–15  (0.00) (0.38) (0.50)
Average of maximum state welfare benefits -0.03** -0.03 -0.02
per month, ages 15–18 (0.01) (0.01)** (0.02)
Average public family planning expenditures -0.34 -0.63 -0.52
per capita, ages 13–19 (0.18)*  (0.18)*** (0.22)**
Whether state Medicaid funds abortion, age 17 0.02 -0.11 -0.00
(0.14) (0.15) (0.19)
Whether state required parental consent for -0.37 -0.45 -0.29
abortion, age 16 (0.30) (0.31) (0.36)
Percentage of individuals in state who belong -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
to a religious organization, ages 12–15 (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
Average state median family income, -0.08
ages 12–15 (0.05)
Average state unemployment rate, ages 12–15 -0.06
(0.06)
African-American = 1 0.30
(0.20)
Mother high school graduate -0.63
(0.16)***
Mother attended college -0.99
 (0.35)***
Mother gave birth as a teen -0.04
(0.13)
Percentage of neighborhood youth who 0.01
are high school dropouts, ages 6–15 (0.01)
(table continues)19
TABLE 2, continued
Reduced-Form Probit Structural Model Structural Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
ab
Variable (Std. Error)  (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Proportion of years mother worked, 0.19
ages 6–15 (0.20)
Proportion of years in poverty, ages 6–15  -0.22
(0.31)
Proportion of years lived with one parent, 0.61
ages 6–15 (0.24)***
Average number of siblings, ages 6–15 0.15
(0.04)***
Average family after-tax income, ages 6–15 -0.01
(0.02)
Proportion of time received AFDC 10–30%, -0.01
ages 6–15 (0.17)
Proportion of time received AFDC 40–70%,   -0.48
ages 6–15 (0.27)*




Percentage of neighborhood adults in labor -0.01
force unemployed, ages 6–15 (0.02)
Percentage of neighborhood families headed 0.01
by a female, ages 6–15 (0.01)
Percentage of neighborhood households headed by 0.00
a person with a high status occupation, ages 6–15 (0.01)
Any religion = 1 -0.37
(0.23)
Proportion of years with a location move, 0.57
ages 6–15 (0.38)




Reduced-Form Probit Structural Model Structural Model
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
ab
Variable (Std. Error)  (Std. Error) (Std. Error)
Average years in the Northeast, ages 12–15   -0.34
 (0.25)
Average years in the South, ages 12–15 -0.28
(0.27)
Average years in the West, ages 12–15 -0.03
(0.30)
Proportion of years family head is disabled, 0.13
ages 6–15 (0.22)
Two parents not present in 1968 (missing -0.35
parental education) (0.18)*
Constant 2.15 1.99 1.21
(1.27)** (0.68)**  (1.17)
Log-Likelihood -350.46 -326.22 -277.88
*Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
Includes difference in logs of expected income, plus policy variables.
a
Adds family and neighborhood variables.
b21
The period over which our sample would be giving birth is 1978–1986. During this time the nonmarital
27
birth rate among girls aged less than 20 was about 11 percent (Mosher and Bachrach, 1996). The rate among
African-American teens was far higher than among whites. Since our data oversamples African Americans, our
higher rates are consistent with the observed rates.
The period described by the state variables reflects the maximum number of years during the relevant
28
period for which information was available. For the welfare variable, only generosity prior to the girl’s childbearing
choice is included. For the unemployment rate variable, we use the rate for the year in which personal income is
measured for the older sample.
These state policy variables are exogenous to the girl’s childbearing decision. While all of them influence
29
and are determined by a broader set of the populations within each state, the age group we study is not likely to
include the median voter (for most years they are too young to vote). Moreover, most of the policy variables
included in our estimates predate the decision period regarding motherhood among these young women.
data are used for estimation; 125, or 14.3 percent, of the young women in our sample gave birth while an
unmarried teen.  The means and standard deviations of these variables are shown in Appendix 2.
27
The first column presents a simple reduced form probit regression run using the 873 young
women in our sample. This estimate does not view the childbearing decision as being influenced by the
expected economic returns to either the decision to bear a child out of wedlock as a teen or the decision
not to bear a child.
A series of policy variables, including those most often cited in the public debate over the causes
of the rapid increase in teen nonmarital births, are included in this specification. The trends from 1976 to
1988 in these central policy variables—welfare generosity, public expenditures on family planning, and
whether the Medicaid program funds abortions in the state—are shown in Figure 2.  The decreasing
28
trend in the family planning/abortion variables is consistent with the recorded increase in teen nonmarital
birth rates; the decline in the real value of welfare benefits over time suggests that this policy variable is
unlikely to have played a sizable role in accounting for the increase in teen birth rates.  
29
The effect of these policy variables on the individual choices of the teen women in our sample
reflects cross-sectional and cohort variation rather than intertemporal variation. Both the level of family
planning expenditures and the prevalence of religious membership in the state in which the woman lived
while aged 13–19 are negatively related to the probability of the nonmarital birth outcome, and are
statistically significant. Consistent with the observed trends in Figure 2, there is a negative andFigure 2













































































Welfare Generosity Public Family Planning Medicaid Funds Abortion23
Our race variable is significant in our final probit equation on teen nonmarital births when the difference
30
in expected income is not included; however, once we control for the difference in expected incomes, race is not
significant at standard levels of significance. This suggests that a major factor behind the far higher rate of teen birth
among African Americans is the difference in expected incomes compared to non-African-American teenagers.
significant coefficient on the generosity of the state’s welfare benefits (youths ages 15–18). The negative
but insignificant coefficient on the state unemployment rate (ages 12–15) is unexpected. The other
policy-related variables (education spending, Medicaid funding of abortion, or a parental consent
requirement) are not statistically significant in this specification. These temporal changes in policy
variables are able to track the observed trend in teen nonmarital fertility rates. In Figure 3 we used
estimated coefficients from the reduced form estimate reported in column 1 of Table 2, which included
only these policy variables and their time trends to predict the trend in the teen out-of-wedlock birth rate.
As shown in Figure 3, the actual and predicted teen fertility variables track quite closely, even though
expected income differences, background, family, and neighborhood characteristics are neglected in this
exercise.
Column 2 presents a simple structural model including the difference in logs of the expected
incomes together with a number of policy variables. The strongest influence of the expected utility
(income) gain variable is in this equation, and suggests that young women do respond to economic
opportunities. Column 3 includes the expected gain term together with a full set of policy, family, and
neighborhood variables. Consistent with many social science models of children’s attainments, these
variables are likely to be related to the probability that a girl will give birth out of wedlock as a teenager.
African-American girls and those whose parents have low education levels are more likely to have a teen
nonmarital birth than are girls without these characteristics.  A number of these family and
30
neighborhood variables are related in a statistically significant way to the birth outcome, including the
number of years the youth lived with one parent while growing up and the average number of siblings
(indicating family size). The number of times the girl changed geographic location when growing up, notFigure 3




















































































Teen Out of Wedlock Birth Predicted Teen Out of Wedlock Birth25
The standard errors in the probit estimations of columns 2 and 3 have not been corrected for the use of a
31
predicted value, and hence should be interpreted with caution.
We accurately predict the outcome for 86 percent of the observations. The proportion is very high
32
(98–100 percent) for those who did not give birth, however, we correctly predict the nonbirth outcome in only 13.6
percent of the cases.
Because the state dummy variables are collinear with the state religion variable, this version of the model
33
excluded the religion variable.
having both parents present in 1968, and whether or not she had religious affiliation are related to the
probability of the nonmarital birth outcome, but are only marginally significant. The expected income
variable remains negative; while the value of the t-statistic for the income gain variable is reduced in this
specification, it remains significant.  We conclude that increasing the expected gain from not giving
31
birth out of wedlock as a teen will reduce the rate of teen nonmarital childbearing.
The results for the policy variables are robust to the inclusion of the economic gain indicator. As
in the column 1 results, family planning expenditures are statistically significant, suggesting an important
potential role of this intervention in decreasing the incidence of nonmarital childbearing. None of the
other state policy variables are statistically significant determinants of teen fertility patterns. Religious
membership is again negatively and significantly associated with the probability of a nonmarital teen
birth.
32
D. Some Alternative Specifications
In order to test the robustness of these results, we altered the specification of the model in a
variety of dimensions. First, to control for unobservable but exogenous differences across states, we
estimated a fixed effects version of both the base and the extended model, including a dummy variable
for each state in which a respondent resided at age 16.  The estimated coefficients on the remaining
33
variables differed little from those reported in columns 2 and 3. The predicted income variable was
marginally significant (t-statistic = 1.65) in the extended model, but remains statistically significant at the
1 percent level in the base model of column 2. The sign on the welfare generosity variable remains26
negative in the base specification, has a very small positive coefficient in the full model, but is not at all
significant in either the base or extended model, implying that in the base (column 2) specification the
welfare variable may be capturing other, unobserved state characteristics. The coefficient on the state
family planning expenditures variable remains negative and significant in the base specification of
column 2, and marginally significant in the column 3 specification. A log-likelihood test to determine if
the addition of the state variables adds to the fit of the model fails to reject the null hypothesis that the fit
is not improved relative to the model reported in the final column of Table 2.
As an alternative to defining the income expectation term as the difference in the logarithm of the
present value of expected incomes, we specified these expectation variables both as the ratio of the with-
birth to the without-birth present values, and as the absolute difference between these two values. We
also created a present-value term for a longer period of time by extending the ages over which we could
create expected income values. Unfortunately, that required us to use the values over ages 19–29
described above and to either extrapolate the two streams from the 11 observation trend or to take the
difference in the two income values observed at age 29 as continuing until retirement. The results of
these specifications are similar to those reported in Table 2.
Finally, we estimated the model using the woman’s income relative to needs in her family unit,
instead of the personal income variables. Again, the results of these estimations are similar to those
reported. The estimated coefficients on the various expectations terms constructed from the family
income-to-needs variables (e.g., differences and ratios of the logs and the absolute values of these family
income-to-needs variables) are consistently negative and highly statistically significant in the models
shown in Table 2. This is true for the total sample, and for the African-American and white subsamples,
with one exception; the estimated coefficient on the variable indicating whether the state allowed27
Results from all of these estimations are available from the authors upon request.
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Medicaid funding for abortions becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level in all of the
estimated models for the white subsample.
34
We also explored the impact of these policy variables on those who grew up in a poor
family—the population most likely to be affected by them. More specifically, we interacted AFDC
generosity and state family planning expenditures with the variable indicating whether the girl grew up in
a poor family. The interaction with welfare generosity has effectively zero statistical significance. The
interaction with family planning expenditures is also not significant; the negative sign on this coefficient
does suggest that family planning efforts may have a greater negative effect on the probability of a teen
birth for girls who grew up in poor families relative to those who grew up in nonpoor families.
E. A Note on Model Identification
Several aspects of our structural model provide for its identification. First, we secure
identification through exclusion restrictions in the first part of the model. The initial probit equation
(estimated to obtain the sample selection variables) requires variables which affect the probability that
individuals in the secondary sample will have a teen nonmarital birth, but which do not have an effect on
the expected incomes of these young women except through the teen nonmarital birth outcome. We use
variables describing the abortion and teen fertility prevalence in the state in which the youth lives,
dummy variables for health status and whether the girl’s mother gave birth as a teen, and the percentage
of people in the girl’s state who are members of a religious organization to gain identification in this part
of the model.
Second, for the income terms to be identified, at least one variable expected to affect income
expectations but not the probability of choosing to have an unmarried teen birth (other than through the
income terms) must be included in the income estimations. In our estimation, five variables provide this28
If utility is assumed to be linear in consumption, and the resulting model is estimated without functional
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form providing any identification, the results are very consistent with those reported. The coefficient estimate on the
predicted income term has the same sign and is significant at the same levels. In addition, the other coefficient
estimates are largely unchanged.
Because data, rather than strong a priori theoretical justification, constrain the use of background data to
36
ages 12–15 for the secondary sample, the model was also estimated without using the timing to provide
identification. In the final stage estimation, the variables measured over ages 12–15 were used for the primary
sample rather than the complete information over ages 6–15. The results from this specification are similar to those
reported.
identification for each age over which income is estimated; they are the median income of the state, the
state unemployment rate, and three dummy variables indicating father’s level of education. In an
alternative specification in which we rely only on functional form and timing for identification, and have
no exclusion restrictions, the income expectations term remains negative, but the t-statistic falls below
unity. In this specification, the coefficient on median state income is negative and insignificant, those on
father’s education are also insignificant, while the coefficient for the state unemployment variable is
negative and significant at the 10 percent level. In a set of specifications that sequentially omit
identifying variables (the father’s education dummy variables, the state unemployment rate, and the state
median income) the results are robust, including in particular that of the income difference term, which is
statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all of these tests for sensitivity to identifying restrictions.
Identification is also achieved through the nonlinear functional forms utilized in the estimation.
Since consumption is entered nonlinearly into the utility function, assuming decreasing marginal utility
from consumption, the predicted income terms in the final estimation stage are the natural logs of income
and thus are not a linear combination of the other independent variables.  Finally, the timing of
35
independent variables (over ages 12–15 in the income predictions; over ages 6–15 in the birth choice
equation, a choice based on data availability) also provide identification of the model.
3629
Because parental education is likely to be associated with a variety of unmeasured parental characteristics
37
(e.g., attitudes toward education, monitoring of behavior), the mandating of high school graduation would not be
likely to generate a change as large as that simulated. A similar caveat applies to our other simulated effects.
V. SIMULATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF POLICY VARIABLES
Although the coefficient estimates of our structural model indicate the sign and statistical
significance of a number of policy-related variables, they reveal little regarding the quantitative impact of
changes in these variables on the probability of a teen nonmarital birth. However, using these estimates,
together with our estimates of the determinants of the predicted income variables, it is possible to
simulate the quantitative effect of changes in a variety of variables of interest on the teen birth outcome.
The results reported in Table 3 combine the direct effect of simulated changes in the policy
variables (based on the full structural model coefficient estimates of Table 2), and their indirect effect
(computed through measuring the impact of the variables on expected incomes, and then translating these
income changes into changes in the probability of a teen nonmarital birth using the coefficient estimate
on the income gain variable in the full structural model ).
The largest simulated impact is for parental education; if it is assumed that all parents with less
than a high school education were to be high school graduates, our model predicts that teen nonmarital
childbearing prevalence would be cut in half.  If we truncate at one the number of location moves per
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family while the child is ages 6–15, the predicted probability of a teen nonmarital birth is reduced by
nearly 10 percent. Similarly, if all children were to grow up in a two-parent household, our model
predicts a 25 percent reduction in the probability of giving birth as an unmarried teen.
If we simulate a 25 percent reduction in the expected income associated with having a nonmarital
birth—E[lnY ]—the probability of teen nonmarital childbearing is reduced by about 24 percent. A 1
similar change in expected income associated with forgoing a nonmarital birth—E[lnY ]—has a 030
TABLE 3
Impact of Policy Variables on the Probability That a Teen Gives Birth while
Unmarried, Based on Model 3 of Table 2
Percentage Direct Indirect
Probability Change Impact Impact
ab
Base probability .0794
25% increase in family planning
expenditures .0659 -17.0%
Parents are high school graduate .0341 -57.1% .0434 .0651
Proportion of time spent in single-
parent household reduced to zero .0597 -24.8% .05884 .0807
Reduce expected income if a
teen mother by 25% .0603 -24.1%
Constrain locational moves to
a maximum of one .0721 - 9.2%
Estimated using the coefficient in the final probit equation and modifying the value of the underlying independent
a
variable for each of the 873 observations as specified.
Estimated using the coefficients in each of the underlying tobit equations used to predict income and modifying
b
the underlying independent variable for each of the 873 observations as specified.31
We also simulated the direct impact of a 25 percent increase in state welfare generosity (including the
38
change through the level of the girls’ choice-specific income expectations), and predicted a decrease in the
nonmarital teen birth outcome of more than 20 percent. This pattern is consistent with the trends in AFDC
generosity and teen nonmarital childbearing over the past two decades (Figure 2). While this variable is statistically
significant in the column 2 model of Table 2, the value of the t-statistic is 1.2 in the column 3 model used for
simulation. This may indicate that young women are little influenced by the short-term income prospects that state
welfare generosity reflects, rather than the longer-term effects reflected in the expected income variable. We would
caution that this negative effect could be due to the association of the state welfare variable with unmeasured state
characteristics; for example, states with more generous welfare benefits may also have a higher cost of living.
However, see our discussion of the estimation with state fixed effects, above.
symmetric, though opposite signed, effect on the predicted probability of a nonmarital birth.  Finally, if
38
we assume that each state increases its funding for family planning services by 25 percent, the probability
of nonmarital childbearing is decreased by about 17 percent.
VI. CONCLUSION
These estimation and simulation results suggest that choice-specific income expectations appear
to have a persistent influence on the childbearing decisions of teen unmarried women. Policy measures
designed to increase the net return to not giving birth out of wedlock—by either increasing expected
income if a birth is forgone, or reducing it if a nonmarital birth occurs—could secure reductions in teen
nonmarital childbearing. The results also suggest that increasing both family planning expenditures and
support for interventions designed to increase parental education and maintain intact families could also
reduce the prevalence of this problem.
A current view in the United States is that reducing AFDC generosity will lead to a reduction in
teen nonmarital births. Our results suggest that the relationship between welfare generosity and teen
nonmarital childbearing is substantially more complex than this simple statement. Our structural model
indicates that a reduction in expected income conditional on a teen having a nonmarital birth—which
reduction could be caused by a reduction in welfare generosity—would tend to reduce the probability of
this outcome. Moreover, state welfare benefit levels themselves are not positively related to the teen32
Moreover, the predicted time trend in the national rate of teen nonmarital childbearing (using our reduced
39
form model based upon only the policy variables) closely mirrors the actual pattern (Figure 3), and increases in spite
of the declining trend in welfare generosity.
nonmarital birth rate. Whether this indicates that welfare generosity is packaged with other state
characteristics and policies, that it is unadjusted for differences in cost of living, or that teens tend not to
respond to short-run differences in one source of income support such as welfare is not clear. However,
the results do suggest that reducing welfare generosity by itself would not reduce the prevalence of this
early childbearing problem.  On the other hand, our finding that increasing expenditures on family
39
planning by the public sector would tend to reduce the probability of teen nonmarital childbearing
suggests that the reduction in the real value of these expenditures and the concurrent increase in the
prevalence of teen nonmarital childbearing may not be merely coincidence.33
APPENDIX 1
Variables Used in Estimation of Selection and Income Prediction Equations
(N=718)
State of Residence Mean St. Dev.
Average of maximum state welfare benefits per month, ages 19–29 $227 99
a
Average state unemployment rate ages, 19–29 7.53% 2.03
a
Average state median family income, ages 19–29 15,060 2,040
a
Percentage of individuals belonging to religious organizations in
state, ages 12–15 24.04% 11.46
Percentage of teens ages 15–19 in state who gave birth 5.59% 1.39
Percentage of pregnant teens ages 15–19 in state who had abortion 37.04% 10.66
Percentage of births in the state which were to teens 29.77% 5.82
Background
African-American = 1 .51 .50
Health is excellent .59 .49
Health is bad                          Health is good is missing category .08 .27
Parental Choice/Opportunities
Mother high school graduate = 1 .32 .47
Mother some college = 1           Mother less than high school graduate is missing category .06 .23
Mother college graduate = 1 .04 .19
Father high school graduate = 1 .17 .38
Father some college = 1           Father less than high school graduate is missing category .07 .25
Father college graduate = 1 .08 .27
Two parents not present in 1968 (missing education) = 1 .26 .44
Average family after-tax income, ages 12–15 15,405 10,264
Average family income/family needs standard, ages 12–15 2.09 1.54
Proportion of years lived with one parent, ages 12–15 .29 .43
Proportion of years mother worked, ages 12–15 .53 .42
Average number of siblings, ages 12–15 3.03 2.00
Proportion of years lived in SMSA, ages 12–15 .75 .41
Mother gave birth as a teen ( yes=1) .39 .49
Proportion of years on AFDC, ages 12–15 .13 .28
Family Circumstances
Proportion of years family head is disabled, ages 12–15 .23 .37
Firstborn = 1 .17 .37
Proportion of years in poverty, ages 12–15 .27 .37
Region
Proportion of years in the South, ages 12–15 .46 .50
Proportion of years in the West, ages 12–15      Avg. years in Midwest is missing category .13 .33
Proportion of years in the Northeast, ages 12–15 .17 .38
In the income estimation, the value of the variable at that age is used. For example, for the equation predicting
a
income at age 19, the value of the variable when the individual was age 19 is used. However, for ease in displaying
descriptive statistics, this table includes the average of the variable over the ages 19 to 29.34
APPENDIX 2
Variables Used in Reduced Form and Structural Model Estimates
(N=873)
State of Residence Mean St. Dev.
Average of maximum state welfare benefits per month, ages 15–18 $354 77
Average public family planning expenditures per capita, ages 13–19 $1.07 .36
Whether state Medicaid funds abortions, age 17 (yes = 1) .49 .50
Whether state required parental consent for abortion, age 16 (yes = 1) .04 .20
Average education expenditures per capita in county, ages 6–15 $334 175
Average state unemployment rate, ages 12–15 6.96% 1.42
Average state median family income, ages 12–15 $15,150 2,020
a
Percentage of individuals belonging to religious organizations in state,
ages 12–15 23.69% 11.21
Background
African-American = 1 .49 .50
Parental Choice/Opportunities
Mother high school graduate = 1 .38 .49
Mother some college = 1          Mother less than high school graduate is missing category .08 .27
Mother college graduate = 1 .04 .19
Religion = 1 .93 .26
Average family after-tax income, ages 6–15 16,390 11,510
Proportion of years lived with one parent, ages 6–15 .28 .39
Proportion of years mother worked, ages 6–15 .57 .37
Average number of siblings, ages 6–15 2.15 1.54
Proportion of years lived in SMSA, ages 6–15 .72 .43
Proportion of years with a location move, ages 6–15 .15 .17
Mother gave birth as a teen ( yes=1) .45 .50
Proportion of time family received AFDC 10–30%, ages 6–15 Family never .16 .36
Proportion of time family received AFDC 40–70%, ages 6–15 received AFDC .07 .26
Proportion of time family received AFDC >70%, ages 6–15 is missing category    .05 .23
Two parents not present in 1968 (missing education) .21 .41
Family Circumstances
Proportion of years family head is disabled, ages 6–15 .18 .29
Firstborn = 1 .21 .41
Proportion of years in poverty, ages 6–15 .23 .32
Neighborhood Attributes
Percentage of families headed by a female, ages 6–15 19.69 13.21
Percentage of adults in labor force unemployed, ages 6–15 7.14 4.10
Percentage of youth who are high school dropouts, ages 6–15 16.67 9.45
Percentage of households headed by a person with a high status 
(managerial or executive) occupation, ages 6–15 19.88 9.78
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